Elias Tsakas

Department of Economics
Maastricht University

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Resisting persuasion
(with Nikolas Tsakas and Dimitrios Xefteris)

Abstract.
Agents that are subject to persuasion attempts often employ strategies that allow them to effectively resist. In the context of Bayesian Persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011), we argue that if appropriate action-contingent payoff adjustments are available to the subject of persuasion, then payoff improvements are achieved. Remarkably, payoff-improving resistance strategies need not involve adding benefits to any action. We characterize the optimal resistance strategy when only costly payoff adjustments are allowed and we show that it induces a perfectly informative signal and a substantial increase in the agent's welfare.