Elias Tsakas

Department of Economics
Maastricht University

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Common belief in approximate rationality
(with Angie Mounir and Andrés Perea)

This paper substitutes the standard rationality assumption with approximate rationality in normal form games. Players are assumed to be ε-rational, i.e. willing to settle for a suboptimal choice, and so give up an amount ε of expected utility, in response to the belief they hold about their opponents' choices. For every player i and every opponents' degree of rationality ε, we require player i to attach at least probability Fi(ε) to his opponent being ε-rational, where the functions Fi are assumed to be common knowledge. We refer to this event as belief in F-rationality. The notion of Common Belief in F-Rationality (CBFR) is then introduced as an approximate rationality counterpart of the established Common Belief in Rationality. Finally, a corresponding recursive procedure is designed that characterizes those beliefs players can hold under CBFR.