Elias Tsakas

Department of Economics
Maastricht University

 Home   Curriculum Vitae   Research   Teaching   Pictures   Research Links   Other Links 
Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: a qualitative analysis
(with Giacomo Bonanno)
Games and Economic Behavior

Abstract.
We study common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a qualitative model of beliefs. We characterize two standard solution concepts for such games: the Iterated Deletion of Borgers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and the Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP). We do so by imposing nested restrictions on the doxastic models: namely, the respective epistemic conditions differ in the fact that IDIP requires the truth axiom whereas IDBS does not. Hence, IDIP refines IDBS.